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9.1 Introduction
The Korean government has maintained a strong fiscal discipline since
the early 1980s, keeping its budget more or less in balance and its debt at
low levels. The fiscal balance showed large deficits after the economic cri-
sis of 1997, but returned to surplus in 2000 thanks to the buoyant economy
and the resumed consolidation eﬀorts. The surplus has continued since
then.
Fiscal soundness is a characteristic common to many East-Asian coun-
tries. Little has been known, however, about the working mechanism of
fiscal policies in these countries. Korea is an interesting case in this regard
because there is an indication that its fiscal discipline, which was firmly es-
tablished under the authoritarian government of the early 1980s, is weak-
ening these days with the democratization of Korean politics.
In addition, the Korean government is faced with various risks that can
adversely aﬀect its financial position. The aging population and the tech-
nological catch-up with the advanced economies imply a much slower eco-
nomic growth in the decades ahead. While the revenue growth slows down,
the demand for public expenditure is increasing rapidly. The financial sec-
tor restructuring in the wake of economic crisis has left irretrievable debts
of 69 trillion won (9 percent of 2004 GDP) in the public sector, and the bur-
den is expected to fall mostly on taxpayers. All public pension schemes
have structural problems due to the imbalance between contributions and
benefits. Some of them (those for civil servants and military personnel) are
already in serious trouble. The economic cooperation with North Korea
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will demand more and more government support in the future. The spend-
ing on social welfare programs has increased substantially after the crisis,
and is set to increase further.
The government expenditure has stabilized since 2001 at around 25 per-
cent of GDP after rising rapidly in the 1990s, but it may resume its growth
and result in worsening fiscal balances when these risk factors materialize.
The Korean government embarked on an ambitious reform agenda to cope
with these challenges and to modernize its system of financial manage-
ment. Its eﬀorts have been concentrated on (a) introducing a medium-term
expenditure framework as embodied in the yearly National Fiscal Man-
agement Plans that cover five years on a rolling basis; (b) moving away from
a bottom-up to a top-down approach in budgeting; (c) strengthening per-
formance management; and (d) introducing program budgeting, that is, re-
organizing budget accounts around a program structure.
This chapter aims to (a) overview the development of public finance in
Korea since the 1970s and analyze its current status; (b) explain the Korean
fiscal management system and outline the recent reform eﬀorts; and (c)
propose ways to improve on these reforms. It is too early to tell to what ex-
tent the newly introduced systems are contributing toward stronger aggre-
gate fiscal discipline and greater allocative and operational eﬃciency. At a
more fundamental level, fiscal outcomes depend on the political, social,
and economic context of a nation as well as its fiscal management system.
In particular, the democratization of Korean politics and the rapid popu-
lation aging will play a dominant role in shaping fiscal outcomes in the fu-
ture. The discussions in this chapter will hopefully help readers understand
the challenges we are facing and gauge the probability of successful imple-
mentation of reforms.
9.2 Korean Public Finance in the Last Three Decades
9.2.1 Large Deficits in the 1970s
In the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the Korean government ran a per-
sistent budget deficit (see figure 9.1). The deficit of the consolidated central
government averaged about 3 percent of GDP in this period. Income
transfer to the agricultural sector, heavy investment in social infrastruc-
ture, and various subsidies to promote heavy and chemical industries re-
quired large amounts of public money. But rapid economic growth helped
contain the spending at around 20 percent of GDP (see figure 9.2).
9.2.2 Fiscal Tightening in the 1980s
A major change in policy stance took place in the early 1980s. The sec-
ond oil shock together with political instability left Korea with spiraling in-
flation and negative income growth in 1980. The new government that
290 Youngsun Koh
came into oﬃce in 1981 tightened monetary and fiscal policies rather dras-
tically.1
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Fig. 9.1 Budget surplus/deficit of the central government
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Fig. 9.2 Central government spending
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
1. The new government recognized the intrinsic problems of the government-led growth
strategy, especially those coming from the promotion of capital-intensive industries. This
strategy distorted the eﬃcient allocation of resources, helped the formation of large business
On the monetary front, the annual growth rate of M2 was halved by the
middle of the 1980s. On the fiscal front, consolidation took the form of re-
duced expenditure. The growth of real government spending was –3 per-
cent in 1983, and remained at low levels until 1987 (see figure 9.3). These
changes coincided with a substantial reduction in inflation. Overall, the
economy grew at a healthy pace up until the recent economic crisis (see fig-
ure 9.4).
One important principle in fiscal management was established in this pe-
riod. It was the principle of Expenditure within Revenue or the balanced
budget principle. While not formalized in a law or a regulation, it acted as
self-discipline imposed on the budget authorities against imprudent man-
agement of the tax money.2
In fact, the strong economic growth and the moderate-to-high inflation
292 Youngsun Koh
conglomerates (the so-called chaebol), aggravated income inequalities, and produced macro-
economic instability. Consequently, the new government adopted “liberalization and stabi-
lization” as its slogan for economic policy. While the stabilization policy was carried out suc-
cessfully as explained in the text, the liberalization policy did not induce suﬃcient structural
reforms in the economy. Many people think that this sowed the seed for the economic crisis
of 1997.
2. One innovation during this period is worthy of note. The Budget Review Committee
(BRC) was set up within the budget oﬃce in 1982 (Bahn 2003). BRC is composed of senior
management of the budget oﬃce. The recommendations of budget examiners regarding the
ministerial budget requests are reviewed by the BRC and then final decisions are made in ses-
sions closed to outsiders. When faced with lobbies from line ministries and other interested
parties, budget examiners find it convenient to pass the burden of budget cuts to the BRC. The
BRC has been very eﬀective in containing the spending increase and establishing fiscal disci-
pline.
Fig. 9.3 Growth of real spending and revenue of the central government
Note: Real values were obtained by deflating nominal values with GDP deflator.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
produced larger-than-expected tax revenues in most years. This in turn
made it relatively easy to keep the budget in balance. The National Pension
Scheme (NPS) that was introduced in 1988 also contributed to the total
revenue by 1 to 3 percent of GDP each year.3
The balanced budget principle kept the public debt to a minimal level. In
1996, the year before the crisis, the gross debt of the central government
was less than 10 percent of GDP, and the net debt was negative; that is, the
central government was a net creditor to the other sectors in the economy.4
The local governments were generally in good shape as well.
Of course, there were costs as well as benefits associated with the bal-
anced budget principle. Some argue that the counter-cyclical role of fiscal
policy was constrained, and essential investment in social infrastructure
was often postponed to contain the overall spending growth. But the Ko-
rean economy was able to achieve strong growth without much cyclical
fluctuation in the decades following the adoption of the balanced budget
principle.5
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3. But the long-term prospect of the NPS is quite bleak. To finance the system, the contri-
bution rate that stands currently at 9 percent will have to rise substantially in the future.
4. There are doubts, however, about the quality of government assets, which are mostly
loans to private entities and local governments.
5. Specifically, the average growth rate was 7.2 percent (with a standard deviation of 3.5
percent) during 1971 to 1982 and 7.0 percent (with a standard deviation of 3.9 percent) dur-
ing 1983 to 2004. The growth performance does not appear fundamentally diﬀerent in these
two periods. In addition, following the estimation method suggested by Bayoumi and Eichen-
green (1995), a formal test can be carried out to see whether the cyclical response of the fiscal
policy was weakened in the latter period. I could find no evidence for such claims.
Fig. 9.4 Output growth and inflation
Source: Bank of Korea (2001).
Most importantly, strict application of the principle enabled the Korean
government to keep the size of government debt at a manageable level, and
provided it with room for maneuver when the crisis hit the economy. With-
out too much worry about the rapid explosion of the budget deficit and
public debt, the Korean government could plan massive fiscal supports to
troubled financial institutions. It also expanded the welfare programs for
the poor and the unemployed substantially.
9.2.3 Economic Crisis and Ballooning Budget Deficit
The fiscal support to financial sector restructuring primarily took the
form of loans to two public corporations—the Korean Deposit Insurance
Corporation (KDIC) and the Korea Asset Management Corporation
(KAMCO).6 The loans were spent on repaying the interest on the restruc-
turing bonds issued by these corporations. The total outstanding stock of
restructuring bonds stood at 102 trillion won (21 percent of 1998 GDP).
Social welfare expenditure also increased significantly after the crisis.
The unemployment rate surged from less than 3 percent in 1997 to 7 per-
cent in 1998, with an accompanying deterioration in income distribution
and an increase in poverty (see figures 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7). In response to
these developments, public assistance to the poor was almost doubled.7
The unemployment insurance scheme, which had been introduced in 1995,
rapidly enlarged its coverage and increased its benefit level.
These developments left an unmistakable mark on the government fi-
nance. The consolidated budget, which remained more or less in balance
before the crisis, dipped into deficit in 1998 of 4 percent of GDP. The ratio
of government debt to GDP rose from 8 percent in 1996 to 15 percent in
1998 (see figure 9.8). When government debt-guarantees were included, the
total public burden climbed to 30 percent of GDP. The bonds issued by the
KAMCO and KDIC constitute most of these government guarantees.
Beginning in 1999, the Korean government resumed its eﬀorts to con-
tain the expenditure growth (see figures 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3). Aided by the dra-
matic rebound of the economy (see figure 9.4) and the rapid growth in rev-
enues, the budget recorded a surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP in 2000. It
remained in surplus in following years.
On the other hand, the debt-to-GDP ratio kept rising despite surpluses
since 2000. This anomaly is due to the fact that these surpluses came mostly
from the National Pension Fund (NPF). The surplus in NPF was 2.6 percent
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6. The KDIC was responsible for recapitalizing underfunded institutions and paying out
the deposits in closed institutions. The KAMCO sold the assets purchased from troubled fi-
nancial institutions in return for the KAMCO bonds.
7. But these expenditures still take up only a small portion of the total budget compared to
western countries, as the social welfare system in Korea is in its early stage of development.
In the future, however, public pension benefits and other welfare spending are certain to drive
up the social welfare expenditures to a level that is comparable to those in western countries.
Fig. 9.5 Labor market indicators
Note: The employment rate refers to persons aged 15 and over who are employed divided by
the working age population.
Source: National Statistical Oﬃce.
Fig. 9.6 Gini coeﬃcient
Source: Yoo (2003).
Fig. 9.7 Relative poverty
Note: The relative poverty refers to the households with incomes below 40 percent of the me-
dian household income divided by the total households.
Source: Yoo (2003).
Fig. 9.8 Debt/GDP ratio
Source: 1953–90, Korea Development Institute (1991); 1991–2004, Ministry of Finance and
Economy.
of GDP in 2004. Most of the surpluses are used to buy assets in the finan-
cial market. These assets will be liquidated later to pay pension benefits to
eligible retirees. When we exclude NPF from the consolidated budget, the
government has consistently run budget deficits since 1989, except in 2002
(see figure 9.9).
9.3 Current State of Public Finance
9.3.1 Financial Balance
As shown in figure 9.9, the consolidated central government budget bal-
ance is overstated due to the surpluses in the NPF. To better assess the fi-
nancial soundness of the government, we need to exclude the NPF from the
consolidated balance. There are two more factors to consider in addition
to the NPF in this regard. One is the net lending and the other is the re-
payment of restructuring bonds by the government.
The large amount of net lending has been a major factor behind large
deficits in 1998 and 1999. In fact, the government lending activity has been
quite extensive since the early days of government-led economic growth
(see figure 9.10). The oﬃcial statistics show that the default rate on gov-
ernment loans is close to 0 percent.8 If this is true, loans do not reflect any
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Fig. 9.9 Budget balance excluding the national pension fund
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
8. But it should be noted that the actual deficit rate may be higher. After all, the government
has frequently introduced rescheduling programs for agricultural loans.
deterioration of the government asset position, and we should disregard
the net lending when assessing the financial health of the government.9
One exception is the government loans made to the KDIC and KAMCO.
In 2002, the government announced a plan to exempt the KDIC and
KAMCO from repaying the loans to the government. This decision essen-
tially converted the loans into direct spending in the years they were made.
The total amount exempted was 22 trillion won. We include these loans in
the consolidated budget balance in the following discussion.
In addition to the loan cancellation, the government is sharing with the
KDIC and KAMCO the obligation on restructuring bonds. According to
the government estimates, the irretrievable loss incurred during financial
sector restructuring would amount to 69 trillion won. The government an-
nounced that it would take up a total of 49 trillion won of restructuring
bonds, repaying their interest and principal. In 2003, 13 trillion won was
spent on transforming part of these bonds into government bonds. The fig-
ure for 2004 to 2006 is 12 trillion won each year. As these expenditures mir-
ror the results of past restructuring activities, we exclude them from the
consolidated balance in 2003 to 2006 and include them in 1997 to 2002.
Table 9.1 shows the results of these adjustments. The adjusted balance is
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Fig. 9.10 Central government loans
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Note: Net lending equals new loans minus repayments.
9. To be precise, the subsidy cost of loans emerging from the disparity between market in-
terest rates and concessional lending rates should be included in government expenditures.
With no reliable estimates on the subsidy cost, however, I decided to simply ignore it.
close to the consolidated balance in 1998 to 2000 but much lower than in
2001 to 2005. For example, in 2004, the balance declines from 5.6 trillion
(0.7 percent of GDP) to –1.1 trillion won (–0.2 percent of GDP) after the
adjustment. But they have been within 0.5 percent of GDP since 2001,
and we can still say that the financial soundness of the government is not a
very serious problem at this stage.
9.3.2 Government Liabilities
Another indicator for the soundness of public finance is government li-
abilities. The debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 25 percent at the end of 2004
(see figure 9.5). When government guarantees are included, it rises to 34 per-
cent. The transformation of restructuring bonds is reducing the amount 
of guarantees at the expense of direct liabilities. But with the adjusted bal-
ance remaining close to zero, the total public burden including direct lia-
bilities and guarantees is stabilizing at 33 to 34 percent of GDP. If an ap-
propriate amount of control is exercised on the spending growth, the total
burden will remain at the current level in the years ahead.
9.3.3 The Size of Government Expenditure
Of course, it is not certain at all whether we would be able to contain the
spending growth successfully in the future. Figure 9.11 shows the consoli-
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Table 9.1 Consolidated budget balance and its adjustment
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a
Consolidated balance –18.8 –13.1 6.5 7.3 22.7 7.6 5.6 5.6
(–3.9) (–2.5) (1.1) (1.2) (3.3) (1.1) (0.7) (0.7)
NPF balance 6.7 6.5 11.2 13.3 15.6 18.5 20.2 24.4
(1.4) (1.2) (1.9) (2.1) (2.3) (2.6) (2.6) (2.9)
Net lending 24.4 19.8 19.8 10.1 0.4 –2.5 1.4 6.4
Loans to KDIC and 
KAMCO 1.3 4.0 5.6 6.0 6.9
Issuance of 
restructuring bondsb 15.8 9.8 4.6 16.0 1.9
Assumption of 
restructuring bonds 13.0 12.0 12.0
Adjusted balancec –18.2 –13.6 5.0 –18.0 –1.3 –0.4 –1.1 0.3
(–3.8) (–2.6) (0.9) (–2.9) (–0.2) (–0.1) (–0.2) (0.0)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are a percentage of GDP. All other numbers are in trillions of won.
aThe figures for 2005 are based on budget.
bIssuance of restructuring bonds is based on the assumption that out of 49 trillion won, 2.1 percent was
issued in 1997, 32.2 in 1998, 19.9 in 1999, 9.4 in 2000, 32.6 in 2001, and 3.8 in 2002, which are the shares
of total restructuring bonds issued in 1997 to 2002.
cAdjusted balance = consolidated balance – NPF balance + net lending – loans to KDIC and KAMCO
– issuance of restructuring bonds + assumption of restructuring bonds.
dated central government expenditure and the adjusted expenditure. Here
the adjustment was made in the same way as in table 9.1 (subtracting the
NPF expenditure, moving forward the repayment of restructuring bonds
to earlier years, and adding the loans to the KDIC and KAMCO). The
consolidated expenditure has been increasing rapidly since the mid-1990s.
Unless conscious eﬀorts are made to contain it, the spending growth is
likely to produce persistent deficits and rising government liabilities in the
future.
Of particular importance are the public pension schemes such as the Na-
tional Pension Scheme (NPS), the Government Employees’ Pension Scheme
(GPES), the Private School Teachers’ Pension Scheme (PSTPS), and the
Military Personnel Pension Scheme (MPPS). These pension schemes share
one common feature—too generous benefits in relation to contributions.
With rapidly aging population (see figure 9.12), this imbalance has produced
and will continue to produce devastating eﬀects on their finance.10
In addition to pensions, health spending will increase rapidly with the
aging population. All in all, the age-related spending will rise from 5 per-
cent of GDP in 2004 to 25 to 30 percent in 2070 according to a projection
by the Korean Institute of Public Finance (see figure 9.13).
Increased spending on pensions and other age-related spending will
300 Youngsun Koh
Fig. 9.11 Adjusted revenue and expenditure
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
10. MPPS has been in deficits over 10 years and requires government supports of about 1
trillion won each year. GPES entered into deficit in 2001, and the deficit is expected to grow
exponentially in coming years. PSTPS has basically the same problem but will experience
diﬃculties in later years. NPS, with its huge coverage, can become a major drain on govern-
ment budget.
drive up the total size of government expenditure. Table 9.2 compares the
general government spending across six countries including Korea. In
2000, the spending-to-GDP ratio was 23.0 percent in Korea and ranged be-
tween 30 and 50 percent in other countries. But when income transfers are
excluded, the ratio declines to 19.4 percent in Korean and 20 to 30 percent
in other countries. In particular, the United States has a lower ratio than
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Fig. 9.12 Population aging
Source: United Nations.
Fig. 9.13 Projected age-related spending
Source: Korea Institute of Public Finance (2005).
Korea. With the increase in age-related expenditures in Korea, the gap be-
tween Korea and other countries will diminish in the future.11
Containing the spending growth is critical in attaining fiscal sustainabil-
ity. It will gain greater importance in the future as the growth potential of
the Korean economy declines. Han and others (2002) forecast the poten-
tial income to grow at a much slower rate in coming years (see table 9.3). Its
growth rate already declined from 7.7 percent in the 1970s to 5.6 percent in
the 1990s, and will decline further to 5.1 percent in 2000 to 2005 and to 4.2
percent in 2005 to 2010, primarily due to the slower growth of labor force.
In fact, the total population is expected to shrink in absolute numbers be-
ginning in around 2030.
The slower economic growth will imply a slower growth in tax revenue.
Expanding government expenditures at the same rate as in previous years
is likely to produce widening deficits, accelerate the decline in national sav-
ing, hamper the fixed capital formation, and further reduce the growth po-
tential.
9.3.4 Functional Classification of Expenditures
Government expenditures can be classified in various ways. Table 9.4
shows the functional classification of the central government expenditure
and net lending in Korea. Defense spending declined rapidly in the 1980s
and 1990s and now corresponds to 11.4 percent of total spending. Educa-
tion has traditionally taken up a large share (15 to 17 percent) of total
spending, but an even larger share has been allocated to economic aﬀairs
(20 to 28 percent). Among the economic aﬀairs, agriculture and trans-
portation have been the major items of spending. On the other hand, social
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11. It is interesting to note in table 9.2 the relatively small size of government consumption
in Korea. It stands at 10.1 percent of GDP. This seems mainly due to the small size of public
employment in Korea. On the other hand, government investment as a percentage of GDP is
larger in Korea than in other countries except Japan.
Table 9.2 General government expenditures (% of GDP)
U.S. Japan Germany France U.K. Korea
Consumption 15.1 16.8 19.0 23.3 19.4 10.1
Net capital outlays 0.9 6.0 3.0 3.3 2.2 8.3
Income transfers 13.7 10.0 18.9 17.8 13.7 3.6
Subsidies 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.3
Interest payments 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.4 0.7
Total 31.2 37.0 45.7 48.8 38.2 23.0
Excluding income transfers (17.5) (27.0) (26.8) (31.0) (24.5) (19.4)
Source: OECD (2003).
Note: The data for Japan and Korea refer to year 2000. Others refer to year 2001.
protection has received relatively little attention in budgetary spending
though its share is growing rapidly in recent years.
The concentration of spending on economic aﬀairs may reflect the less-
developed-country status of Korea. Perhaps we still need large investment
in roads, ports, and railways. Perhaps we still need to provide large gov-
ernment loans to the agricultural, manufacturing, and construction sec-
tors because the financial market is not yet fully developed. But there are
strong doubts about these assumptions.
First, the rapid increase in spending on social infrastructure during the
1990s need not be sustained in the future. Many (but certainly not all) ex-
perts in this area agree that, with the ever-stringent budget constraint and
the completion of major road-building programs, it is time to reorganize
the overall investment strategy. In particular, we should pay more atten-
tion to the demand-management (e.g., through an increased use of user-
charging) and the proper maintenance of existing stocks of infrastructure.
Second, the Korean financial market has undergone a rapid change
since the 1980s and especially after the economic crisis. Banks are rapidly
expanding their lending to households and small- and medium-sized en-
terprises, and large corporations are turning ever more to capital (stock
and bond) markets. The government appears to be playing a substitutive,
rather than complementary, role to commercial banks in many cases. It is
now generally believed that the government should reduce its role as a
provider of financial resources for businesses. The reduced government
role in this area will not only help restrain the growth of public spending
but also promote the development of private financial markets and reduce
the distortion in resource allocation.
On the other hand, the government should increase its eﬀort in the pro-
vision of basic public service such as security and safety, fire-fighting,
judicial services, promotion of competitive business practices, prudential
regulation of financial institutions, statistical services, environmental pro-
tection, and so on. These services are vital for the long-term economic
growth and social development. Unfortunately, their importance has been
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Table 9.3 Forecasts of national income (%)
1963–70 1970–79 1979–90 1990–2000 2000–05 2005–10
Growth in national income 8.94 7.67 7.29 5.61 5.14 4.17
Contributions from:
Inputs 4.35 4.23 4.80 3.00 2.85 2.06
Labor 3.67 3.06 2.90 1.60 1.28 0.89
Workers 3.44 2.90 2.39 1.28 1.21 0.82
Capital 0.68 1.17 1.90 1.40 1.57 1.17
Total factor productivity 4.59 3.44 2.49 2.61 2.29 2.11
Source: Han et al. (2002).
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generally understated to this day in Korea. For example, competition pol-
icy is still at its early stage of development. Statistical services also have
large room for improvement, as illustrated by the lack of reliable data on
gross regional product even though the government has historically em-
phasized the importance of mitigating regional disparities.
At the same time, more eﬀorts are needed to reduce the outstanding
stock of government loans. Figure 9.14 shows that in 1997 to 1999, gov-
ernment loans grew by about the same amount as government liabilities.
That is, the government issued bonds and other debt instruments and used
the proceeds to extend loans to the private sector. The trend was reversed
in recent years, but the outstanding stock of loans still stood at 13 percent
of GDP at the end of 2004.
Government loans typically have maturity of 5 to 10 years while most of
government bonds have maturity of less than 5 years. The interest rates on
loans are lower than those on government bonds. Such diﬀerences in matu-
rities and interest rates impose a financial burden on the government over
longer terms.
9.4 Institutional Setup and Reform Eﬀorts in Korea
9.4.1 The Structure of the Budget
General Accounts, Special Accounts, and Funds
The budget of the central government as voted on in the National As-
sembly is comprised of one general account and various special accounts.
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Fig. 9.14 Government assets and liabilities
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
There were a total of 23 special accounts in the fiscal year 2005 budget 
(see table 9.5). Revenue sources for the general account include general-
purpose (not ear-marked) taxes and nontax revenues. On the other hand,
many special accounts have their own special ear-marked taxes or quasi-
taxes (i.e., fees, charges, and other mandatory contributions). Transfers
from the general account also make up a large portion of resources for spe-
cial accounts.
On a consolidated basis, the central government budget includes, in ad-
dition to the general and special accounts, numerous funds. There were 57
funds in 2005 including the National Pension Fund, the Employment In-
surance Fund, and the Foreign Exchange Stabilization Fund. These funds
were established much like special accounts to achieve specific policy ob-
jectives, and many of them have their own revenue sources including quasi-
taxes.12
The diﬀerence between the funds and the general and special accounts
lies in the managerial flexibility allowed for the former. Ministries can
freely change fund expenditures within 30 percent of the planned amount
without notice to the budget authorities and the National Assembly (see
table 9.6). The line items in the operational plans of funds are much less de-
tailed than those in the general and special accounts. Their cash flows are
managed independently by line ministries and do not pass through the
treasury single account held in the Bank of Korea.
The general account, special accounts, and funds form the consolidated
central government budget (see figure 9.15). The share of general account
in the total consolidated expenditure and net lending stood at 55 percent
in 2004, and those for special accounts and funds at 16 percent and 29 per-
cent, respectively.13
Drawbacks
The highly complex structure of the budget has been criticized in many
aspects.14 First, it limits the ability of the budget authorities to centralize
all national resources and then allocate them based on national priority. As
mentioned previously, special accounts and various funds have their own
sources of revenue, which are not easily transferable to the general account
or any other special accounts and funds in response to changing circum-
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12. There were 101 quasi-taxes for special accounts and funds at the end of 2001 and their
total revenue was estimated to be around 1 percent of GDP (OECD 2003).
13. The U.S. federal government also has a large number of trust funds, special funds, and
public enterprise funds in addition to the general fund (U.S. GAO 2001). In 1999, the spend-
ing of the funds other than the general fund corresponded to around 55 percent of total fed-
eral spending. But most of them (33 out of 55 percent) represented long-term commitments
such as social security. In the case of Korea, long-term commitments occupy only about 10 per-
cent of total spending.
14. There is much similarity between the Korean and the Japanese budget system. See Bay-
oumi (1998) for the Japanese system.
stances. This compartmentalization and fragmentation of resources re-
duces the allocative eﬃciency of the budget.
Second, fiscal transparency and program eﬃciency are also undermined
by the complicated budget structure. Various accounts and funds are intri-
cately interrelated through complicated flow of grants and loans. It is diﬃ-
cult to see how much funding is being allocated to various spending areas.
The functional classification of spending is not reported for the consoli-
dated budget, and it is reported only for the previous year’s outturns with
Reforming the Fiscal Management System in Korea 307
Table 9.5 Special accounts
Fiscal financing Environmental reconstruction
National property management National medical center management
Agriculture and fisheries structural Land management and balanced regional 
adjustment development
Rural development tax management Postal insurance service
Transportation facilities Automobile traffic management
Registration Patent management
Management of funds transferred to Balanced national development
local governments Grain management 
Prison operation Agency
Military personnel pension National railroad
Management of funds transferred to local Communication service
educational agencies Government procurement
Energy and resources
Table 9.6 Characteristics of the general account, special accounts, and funds
General account Special accounts Funds
Objective Supporting general Supporting specific Supporting specific 
fiscal activities. programs. programs.
Revenues General-purpose Ear-marked taxes, Mandatory 
taxes and nontax mandatory contributions, contributions, transfers 
revenues. transfers from other from other accounts 
accounts and funds, etc. and funds, etc.
Expenditures Unrequited expenditures. Unrequited expenditures Unrequited expenditures 
and loans. and loans.
Linkages between None. Clear linkages. Clear linkages.
revenues and 
expenditures
Authorization Voted on in the National Same as general account. Same as general 
and execution Assembly. Controlled account but larger 
of expenditure and monitored during flexibility guaranteed
plans execution as mandated in implementation.a
by the Constitution.
aMinistries can change fund expenditures within 30 percent of the planned amount without notice to the
budget authorities and the National Assembly. Cash flows are managed independently by the ministries
in charge and do not go through the treasury single account held in the Bank of Korea. Unlimited carry-
overs of unused cash are allowed.
a considerable time-lag of more than a year. We can find many programs
with similar policy objectives and tools but under diﬀerent accounts and
funds. Consolidating similar programs would contribute to greater alloca-
tive and technical eﬃciency with increased transparency.
Government Eﬀorts
The government is making eﬀorts to simplify the budget structure and
strengthen transparency and accountability. The most important change
occurred with the revision of the Fund Management Act and the National
Assembly Act in 2001. Previously, there were two types of funds—“public
funds” and “other funds.” The operational plans of “public funds” were
prepared by responsible ministries and reported to the National Assembly
but did not require the latter’s approval. Those of “other funds” were not
even reported to the National Assembly. In this sense, public and other
funds were oﬀ-budget accounts.
In 2001, they were regrouped into “funds” and “financial funds.” “Funds”
include all of the previous “public funds” and some of “other funds.”
“Funds” were moved from oﬀ-budget to on-budget: the operational plans
of “funds” now require the approval by the National Assembly and their fi-
nancial reports are submitted to the latter, just like the general account and
special accounts.15 In 2004, further changes were made to move “financial
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Fig. 9.15 Expenditure and net lending by accounts and funds
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
15. This change in typology produced discontinuity in the time series of fiscal data. Before
2001, the consolidated spending and revenue data included “public funds” and excluded
“other funds.” After 2001, they include “funds” and exclude “financial funds.” As a result,
several important funds such as the Teachers’ Pension Fund are now included in the consol-
funds” from oﬀ-budget to on-budget and subject them to the same degree
of control by the National Assembly.
The government also introduced a review process in the Fund Manage-
ment Act to abolish obsolete funds and consolidate those with similar
objectives. The first such review was conducted in 2004 and subsequent re-
views are scheduled every three years in the future.16 In addition, a sepa-
rate, ad hoc review was conducted on special accounts in 2004. The results
of these two reviews were presented to the president in May 2005 in a com-
bined report and received his approval. The government is in the process of
revising various laws that provide legal bases for individual special ac-
counts and funds. It remains to be seen how many of the recommendations
will survive the opposition from diverse interest groups and succeed in the
revision of relevant laws.
The past experience does not oﬀer a very good prospect. The number of
funds declined from 114 in 1994 to 53 in 2002 but since then has stayed at
around 55 (see table 9.7) despite the government’s eﬀort to reduce it fur-
ther. A few special accounts were to be closed down in past years (the
Transportation and the Registration Special Accounts in 2003 and the Ru-
ral Development Tax Management Special Account in 2004). But the pres-
sure from interest groups saved their lives and none were closed down.
On the other hand, a series of new initiatives that are recently being in-
troduced—the medium-term expenditure framework, top-down budget-
ing, performance management, and program budgeting—are expected to
reduce the line ministries’ incentives to secure funding through special ac-
counts and funds and to help MPB in improving the allocative and opera-
tional eﬃciency of spending. More will be discussed in the following on
these initiatives.
9.4.2 Major Players and the Fiscal Discipline
Major Players
Major players in the budget process include the Ministry of Planning
and Budget (MPB), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), and
the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI, see table 9.8). MPB is responsible
for preparing the draft budget with the help of the Tax and Customs Oﬃce
in MOFE that provides revenue forecasts. When the budget is authorized
by the National Assembly, MPB prepares the quarterly budget implemen-
tation plans usually within a month and allocates funds to line ministries.
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idated financial statistics. But no attempt has been made to revise previous data to eliminate
discontinuity.
16. These reviews are called Retention Reviews. Apart from the Retention Review, the gov-
ernment has also been conducting annual Management Reviews since 1999. Management Re-
views look at the operational eﬃciency of funds, including the adequacy of their asset man-
agement practices.
Table 9.7 Number of funds
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
At the start of 
the year 114 106 99 76 75 76 75 62 53 58 59
Established 
during the year 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 8 3 2 57
Closed during 
the year –14 –11 –27 –4 –2 –3 –16 –8 –4 –2 –4
At the end of 
the year 106 99 76 75 76 75 61 53 58 59 57
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget (2005).
Note: Includes public and other funds before 2002 and funds and financial funds since then.
Table 9.8 Major players in Korea’s budget process
Players Roles
Ministry of Planning • Compiles budget bids and prepares the draft budget.
and Budget (MPB) • Allocates funds to spending ministries (apportionment).
• Approves the transfers of funds between line items (virements).
Treasury Bureau of the • Releases cash to spending ministries.
Ministry of Finance and • Manages the treasury single account held in the Bank of Korea.
Economy (MOFE) • Issues treasury bonds and manages assets and liabilities.
• Collects ministerial financial reports, prepares the whole-of-
government financial reports, and sends them to the BAI.
• Produces the government financial statistics.
Tax and Customs Office • In charge of tax policy.
of MOFE • Prepares revenue forecasts.
• Oversees the National Tax Service and the Customs Service.
Ministry of Government • In charge of local government tax and spending policies.
Administration and Home • Allocates the Local Shared Taxes (a formula-based block grant)
Affairs (MOGAHA) • to local governments.
• Coordinates the central government subsidies to local
governments.
• Approves the borrowing by individual local governments.
Board of Audit and • The supreme audit institution in Korea, whose head is nominated 
Inspection (BAI) • by and reports to the president. The National Assembly can also 
• request audits on specific issues to the BAI.
• Checks the regularity of ministerial activities.
• Prepares and tables the financial report to the National Assembly.
National Assembly • Deliberates and votes on the budget.
• Approves the transfers of funds between programs.
• Reviews and approves audit reports.
Spending ministries • Execute the budget and prepare financial reports.
The Treasury Bureau of MOFE then prepares the monthly cash plans and
releases cash to line ministries. The Treasury Bureau keeps track of cash
flows into and from the treasury single account held in the Bank of Korea.
It is also responsible for issuing government bonds and managing govern-
ment assets and liabilities.
An important issue concerning the interplay among various players is
that of fiscal discipline. The budget process in Korea has generally taken a
highly centralized, strategic dominance-based approach in the terminol-
ogy of von Hagen and Harden (1996). These authors distinguish between
two approaches in budgeting. Under a target-based approach, the govern-
ment collectively negotiates a set of binding, numerical targets for the bud-
get. The budget process starts with negotiations among concerned parties
over binding limits on the spending total or budget deficits. Once these lim-
its have been agreed upon, they must be observed during the remainder of
the budget process. On the other hand, under a strategic dominance-based
approach, the budget process vests the budget authorities with special stra-
tegic powers. Often the main budgeting decisions are made in bilateral ne-
gotiations between the budget authorities and spending ministries.
The 1970s and 1980s
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) played a
central role in budgeting as well as in preparing and implementing eco-
nomic development plans. EPB was the leading ministry within govern-
ment, as reflected in the title of the head of EPB as deputy prime minister.
Negotiations over spending bids were conducted bilaterally between the dep-
uty prime minister and spending ministers. Little reconciliation occurred
in the cabinet regarding the draft budget prepared by the deputy prime
minister.
The authoritarian nature of previous governments also limited the role
of the National Assembly in the deliberation of draft budget. The National
Assembly has been traditionally dominated by the party of the president.
Insofar as the government had already consulted the ruling party before
presenting the draft budget to the National Assembly, amendments typi-
cally entailed minor changes in the budget (see figure 9.16). In addition, the
constitution prohibits the National Assembly from increasing the total
spending or introducing new spending items unless agreed on by the gov-
ernment.
EPB also exercised tight control on expenditures in the implementation
stage. Ministries were required to spend within the limits set in the quar-
terly budget implementation plan. EPB could postpone or block part of
the expenditures (those classified as discretionary allocation items) when
deemed necessary. All limits on expenditures were imposed in cash terms.
Transfers across appropriation accounts (virements) were prohibited un-
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less authorized by the National Assembly or by EPB. In addition, supple-
mentary budgets were normally introduced only once a year.
The Treasury Bureau of MOFE also had a tight grip on cash outflow. All
cash disbursements were made strictly within the limits set in the monthly
cash plans. Before the crisis of 1997, it was not uncommon for the Treasury
Bureau to delay disbursements to line ministries when there was not
enough cash left in the treasury account due to the seasonality in tax col-
lection. This was in spite of the fact that they could issue short-term debt
instruments within the limit set by the National Assembly to bridge the gap
between tax collection and cash needs. In addition, the revenue forecasts
prepared by the Tax and Customs Oﬃce were often very conservative with
the actual tax collection overshooting the forecast by substantial margins.
The 1990s and After
Most of these characteristics carried over until recently. In the early 1990s,
EPB and the Ministry of Finance were merged into the Ministry of Finance
and Economy (MOFE), and the deputy prime minister-ship was handed
over to the head of the MOFE.17 The latter exercised the same degree of cen-
tralizing power in budgeting as the head of the EPB (see figure 9.17).
But the recent reorganization in government resulted in a subtle change
312 Youngsun Koh
Fig. 9.16 Budget amendments
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget (2005).
17. This merger signaled the oﬃcial closing of the planning-based development era. At the
same time, the newly established Korea Fair Trade Commission took charge of competition
policies in place of EPB, and the evaluation function of EPB was moved to the prime minis-
ter’s oﬃce.
in the budget process. After the economic crisis, the budgeting function
was separated from MOFE and moved to the newly created MPB.18 Previ-
ously, the EPB and then the MOFE had the formal role in setting the over-
all policy agenda and coordinating activities across the government. After
the reorganization, the coordination role together with the prime minister-
ship was kept in the MOFE, and the MPB was devoid of such functions.19
All these factors can act to reduce the centralizing power of MPB. In addi-
tion, the balance of power between the executive branch and the legislature
is tipping toward the latter with the democratization of Korean politics.
Assessment
There is not yet a visible sign that these changes have weakened the cen-
tralizing power of MPB and the fiscal discipline substantially. But the risk
is increasing, as illustrated for example in the increasing number of annual
supplementary budgets after the crisis (see figure 9.18). In most cases, the
supplementary budgets were introduced to stimulate the economy.
We also observe some changes in the cash management and revenue
forecast practices in the post-crisis period. To bridge the gap between tax
collection and cash needs, and to finance the front-loading20 of annual
spending that has been popular since 1999, MOFE is resorting more and
more to short-term debt issues. The downward bias in revenue forecasts is
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Fig. 9.17 Organizational change in the budgeting function
18. Before the separation, MOFE was a super-ministry in charge of general economic pol-
icy coordination, macroeconomic policies, budget preparation, tax policies, financial market
policies, external economic relations, and treasury function. Many believed that the lack of
check-and-balance as seen in the previous periods between EPB and MOF, together with the
unmanageably large span of control of the Minister for Finance and Economy, veered eco-
nomic policy-making oﬀ the right track, and contributed to the outbreak of financial crisis.
The focus of criticism was laid on the bureau of financial market policies within MOFE,
which was subsequently reduced in size and whose regulatory function was transferred to the
newly created Financial Supervisory Commission. In addition, the Bank of Korea was
granted instrumental independence from MOFE.
19. Compared to EPB’s responsibilities, MPB’s exclude economic policy coordination, ex-
ternal economic relations, and competition policies.
20. In front-loading exercises, MPB would allocate more funds than usual to the first half
of the year, and urge line ministries to spend the allocated funds as early as possible. When
necessary, that is when the growth is slower than expected despite front-loading, MPB would
consider introducing a supplementary budget in the latter half of the year.
also being reduced. In 2004, we actually had a large shortfall in tax collec-
tion, which was partly blamed on an overly optimistic assumption on the
economic growth, which was in turn claimed by some to have been politi-
cally motivated.
Part of these changes look inevitable. The democratization of the Ko-
rean politics and the devolution of budgetary power to line ministries are
an unavoidable trend. The separation of budgeting function from policy
coordination function was intended to reduce the concentration of powers
in one large dinosaur ministry (Ministry of Finance and Economy) that is
believed to have contributed to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Utiliz-
ing short-term debt instruments to neutralize the impact of seasonality in
tax collection is in itself a desirable practice.
But it is also true that there is an increasing risk of overspending and
weakened fiscal discipline. We are in need of a new system of expenditure
management that can cope with such a risk, for example by gradually 
moving away from strategic-dominance approach toward target-based ap-
proach. The medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) is one such
option. Under MTEF, the budget authorities prepare annual budgets with
a medium-term perspective in a top-down way. More will be discussed in
the following on the MTEF.
314 Youngsun Koh
Fig. 9.18 Number of supplementary budgets introduced
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget (2005).
9.4.3 The Budget Process
Before the Introduction of the MTEF
The budget process in the Korean central government has undergone a
significant change in recent years. The government introduced the MTEF
together with a top-down budgeting in 2004 for fiscal year 2005.21 The bud-
get process before the change is summarized in table 9.9.
The recent reform was intended to address several defects found in the
previous budgeting practice. First, prior to the introduction of the MTEF,
budgeting was centered on the next single budget year, lacking a medium-
term perspective. MPB and the National Assembly gave little considera-
tion to the out-years beyond the budget year. Line ministries had little in-
formation on how much resource would be available to them in the future,
and their medium- to long-term planning function was severely limited.
Limited planning function in turn reduced the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency
of overall public spending.
It was also diﬃcult for MPB to identify and cope with the trend increase
in spending. Without a long-term view on the appropriate level of tax bur-
den, MPB would simply allow an ever-increasing public spending to ac-
commodate rising demands from various sectors. The focus on a single
budget year also fostered incrementalism in budgeting and hindered a
strategic reprioritization of spending.
In addition, the counter-cyclical role of fiscal policy could be constrained
when the attention was focused on a single year. The principle of balanced
budget in each year had the potential to produce a procyclical fluctuation
in spending as illustrated in panel (a) of figure 9.19. If, on the other hand,
spending increases at a constant rate as in panel (b) and the balanced bud-
get is pursued on average over the business cycle, the so-called automatic
stabilizer can be given a full force.
Second, before the introduction of the top-down process, budgeting re-
lied excessively on a bottom-up approach. At the initial stage of budget
preparation, MPB made rough estimates of the total size and the sectoral
allocation of the next year’s budget. But the estimates were not transmitted
to line ministries and therefore could not guide line ministries in preparing
their budget requests. When reviewing their budget requests, MPB focused
on the microscopic spending control of individual programs. The sectoral
allocation and the total size of the budget were determined at the last stage
of budget preparation by aggregating the expenditures on individual pro-
grams.
As a result, the control of inputs assumed a major significance in budget
discussions and little attention was paid to outputs or outcomes. Absorbed
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21. Potter and Diamond (1999), Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999), and World Bank
(1998) provide a useful guide on the reform in this direction.
in details, MPB had little time to review and analyze important policy is-
sues, and the linkage between budgeting and policy making was very weak.
The budget negotiation between MPB and line ministries was a very time-
consuming process for both parties. The accountability and autonomy of
line ministries in preparing and managing their budget were also severely
limited. Line ministries usually requested an unrealistically large amount
of budget, and massive cuts by MPB were inevitable.
A third characteristic of the previous budgeting practice was the central
stage accorded to the general account. MPB spent most of its eﬀorts on re-
viewing and preparing the budget of the general account and paid less at-
tention to special accounts and funds.
The previous approach had certain merits. The budget authorities had
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Table 9.9 Key steps of the budget process before the introduction of the MTEF
Action
January • The fiscal year starts on January 1st.
March • The Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) sends the Guide to
Budget Compilation to spending ministries.
May • Ministries send budget bids to MPB by the end of May.
June–July • MPB compiles the budget bids and prepares a preliminary budget
proposal.
August–September • MPB goes through bilateral negotiations with spending ministries
between mid-August and mid-September.
• MPB discusses the budget proposal with the ruling party.
October • Authorized by the cabinet and the president, the draft budget is sent
to the National Assembly by October 2nd.
• In mid-October, the Committee on Budget and Accounts begins
deliberation on the draft budget. Ministries are typically requested 
to testify at committee meetings. Meetings are normally open to the
public.
December • The draft budget is modified and approved by the Committee on
Budget and Accounts and finally by the National Assembly by
December 2nd.
Fig. 9.19 Management of spending over the business cycles
large discretion over the annual spending and used their power to contain
the spending growth and adjust it to changing revenue conditions. To some
degree, such short-termism was inevitable in Korea where the socioeco-
nomic environment changes quite rapidly and unexpectedly. In addition,
by emphasizing the input control and the regularity of budget execution,
the abuse or misuse of tax money could be minimized. But the growing size
and complexity of budget is making it necessary for MPB to deregulate the
budgeting process, enhance autonomy and accountability of line min-
istries, and focus on the strategic management of public finance.
After the Introduction of the MTEF
With the introduction of the MTEF and the top-down budgeting, all
these practices are changing. Now the annual budgeting exercise starts
with a discussion on fiscal policy over a five-year period including the cur-
rent year, the budget year, and three out-years. Following this discussion,
MPB transmits spending ceilings for sectors and programs to line min-
istries.22 These ceilings encompass the general and special accounts and
funds. Line ministries are asked to prepare their budget requests within
these ceilings. When reviewing the ministerial budget requests, MPB places
less emphasis on the microscopic control of line items and more on the
strategic alignment of budget requests with overall policy directions.
Key steps of the new budget process are explained in table 9.10. The bud-
get cycle starts in January, earlier than in previous years. The workload of
budget examiners are accordingly spread out over a year rather than concen-
trated in July and August. This is deemed another merit of the new system.
The new system is already producing tangible results. In fiscal year 2005,
the budget requests by line ministries represented an increase of 11.7 per-
cent over the previous year’s budget. This was much smaller than the 30.8
percent increase in fiscal year 2004. Line ministries also voluntarily shuﬄed
a larger portion of their spending across programs, cutting back 2.7 trillion
won on existing ones and introducing new ones worth 3.0 trillion won. The
corresponding figures for fiscal year 2004 were 1.6 and 1.5 trillion won, re-
spectively.
Room to Improve
There is of course room to improve. The first three points explained in the
following concern the behavioral changes that are needed in MPB and 
line ministries over the medium term. The next seven points concern the
changes in the budgetary system and MTEF that need immediate attention.
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22. Ceilings are set for 14 spending areas such as social infrastructure, agriculture, educa-
tion, and environment and then disaggregated into 56 programs. For example, social infra-
structure has 7 programs, including roads, railways, subways, seaports, airports, housing, and
water resources. Separate ceilings are also set within each program for the general account
and various special accounts and funds.
First, performance management in line ministries should be strength-
ened. In the discussion on policy directions and resource allocation, per-
formance information can provide a valuable guide. There have been
eﬀorts in this direction, but none of them have yet succeeded in instilling
performance orientation in line ministries. Details on the current reform
eﬀorts will be given in the next subsection.
Second, the planning and priority-setting capacity in line ministries
should be enhanced. For example, line ministries should be required to
publish long-term strategic plans, annual business plans, and annual per-
formance reports. The planning and budget divisions of individual line
ministries should play a greater role in the coordination of ministerial poli-
cies and budget requests unlike in previous years when they would simply
compile budget requests from program divisions and send them to MPB
with little modification.
Third, the role of MPB should also be changed. As a central coordina-
tor of government policies, MPB should strengthen its capacity for policy
analysis and long-term forecasts. It should stress less on input control and
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Table 9.10 Key steps of the budget process after the introduction of the MTEF
Action
December • The Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) sends to line ministries
standard assumptions on macro-variables such as inflation, interest
rates, exchange rates, etc.
• Sectoral task forces are organized. They are composed of private-
sector experts and government officials from MPB and relevant
ministries.
January–April • Line ministries submit to MPB their estimates of spending needs
over the next 5 years by the end of January.
• Sectoral task forces discuss major policy issues and present their
recommendations in a series of public hearings held in March and
April.
• By the end of April, MPB prepares a draft National Fiscal
Management Plan (NFMP) through discussions with line ministries.
The draft NFMP contains major policy directions and fiscal
aggregates (total spending, deficits, debts, etc.) for the next 5 years
and tentative spending ceilings on sectors and programs for the
budget year.
Cabinet meeting • At the end of April, a cabinet meeting, chaired by the president, is
held in a secluded place to discuss and finalize the ceilings.
• Following the meeting, the ceilings are transmitted to line ministries
in the Guide to Budget Preparation.
May–June • Line ministries prepare their budget requests and send them to MPB.
July–August • MPB prepares the draft budget. Less emphasis is placed on the
microscopic control of line items and more on the strategic alignment
of budget requests with overall policy directions.
August–December • Goes through the same process as before the introduction of MTEF.
pay more attention to outputs and outcomes. It should act as a consultant
for line ministries to enhance their program performance and strive to
build mutual trust in a collective action game.
Fourth, the medium-term targets in the MTEF should be clarified.
Presently, it is not clear which variable the government is targeting at in the
medium term—the budget balance, the total spending, or the debt-to-GDP
ratio. They are presented in NFMP merely as “projections” rather than as
“targets.” An ideal strategy would be targeting at a balanced budget over the
business cycle.23 Deficits are allowed in a period of slow growths but they are
subsequently oﬀset by surpluses in a period of high growths, and the accu-
mulation of debt is held down over the cycle. The debt-to-GDP ratio de-
clines slowly as the GDP expands. Examples of this strategy can be found
in the Growth and Stability Pact (GSP) of the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), the golden rule of the British government, and the
2-percent structural surplus rule of the Swedish government.24
Fifth, it is necessary to set out the annual operational targets that can
guarantee the achievement of the medium-term targets. There are two
types of operational targets commonly employed, namely budget balance
and total spending. A prime example of the former is the 3-percent deficit
rule of the EMU. In contrast, the Swedish government imposes an expen-
diture ceiling on each of the three years ahead. The United Kingdom has
adopted similar practices for expenditure control. The U.S. federal gov-
ernment experimented with both types of targets in the 1980s and 1990s
(see box).
Between these types of targets, total spending is a superior choice be-
cause (a) it is less influenced by the cyclical position of the economy and
therefore easier to control; and (b) it assists in a counter-cyclical manage-
ment of fiscal policy by leaving the balance to fluctuate flexibly over the
cycle. Presently, the Korean government intends to keep the annual spend-
ing totals unchanged in successive NFMPs, and thus appears to have the
total spending as annual targets. But this point needs to be clearly com-
municated to the public.25
Sixth, it is desirable to introduce various risk analyses in the National
Fiscal Management Plan. Such analyses would address such issues as (a)
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23. Given the low level of debt-to-GDP ratio in Korea, it seems unnecessary to target at sur-
pluses over the cycles.
24. The GSP commits the member countries to achieve and maintain a budget position of
close to balance or in surplus over the cycle. The golden rule allows the British government to
borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending over the cycle. The current Swedish
government is targeting at an average surplus of 2 percent of GDP over the cycle (Gustafsson
2004).
25. With a fixed total spending, it may be diﬃcult to cope with an unexpected surge of
spending needs, for example in times of economic hardship. An escape clause may be needed
that is not too lax to undermine fiscal discipline or too stringent to accommodate reasonable
demands for increased spending.
the deviation of medium-term growth rates and other macroeconomic
variables from their projected levels; (b) explicit and implicit contingent li-
abilities of the government coming from loan guarantees, public corpora-
tions, local governments, and others; and (c) population aging.
Seventh, a mechanism for baseline projections should be established.
MPB currently provides line ministries with standard assumptions on key
macrovariables such as wage and price inflation. Based on these assump-
tions, line ministries project their spending needs for the next five years.
But they should go further and distinguish between spending on existing
programs (baselines), costs of new policy initiatives, and savings options.
MPB would check the validity of ministerial projections and aggregate
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Experience of the U.S. Federal Government on Deficit Control
The United States experimented with both types of annual operational targets explained
in the text. In the 1980s, targets were set up for budget deficits. The Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act of 1985 (GRH I) prescribed deficit ceilings in nominal dollars for the next
five years. The strategy, however, did not work. The actual deficits exceeded the stipulated
ceilings in all years covered by GRH I. In 1987, GRH II was enacted and the deficit ceil-
ings were adjusted upward to accommodate this reality. But it did not take long before
GRH II also proved to be a failure.
In 1990, a new strategy was adopted with the enactment of the Budget Enforcement
Act (BEA). Instead of setting limits on deficits, the congress introduced separate rules
for discretionary spending and mandatory spending. On discretionary spending, cash
limits were imposed for the next five years. Except in special circumstances, these limits
were not to be breached. For mandatory spending (interest payments, social security
benefits, etc.), which depend on exogenous variables such as interest rates and the num-
ber of the elderly, the so-called “pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)” principle was introduced. In
PAYGO, any increase in deficits resulting from policy changes should be offset by corre-
sponding changes in revenues or mandatory spending.
The new strategy worked well. It was renewed in 1993 and 1997. Actual spending on
discretionary programs turned out to be larger than stipulated in the law every year ex-
cept in 1996 (see table 9.11). But the excess was always less than 1 percent of the stipu-
lated amounts, and was mostly due to exception events such as the Gulf war and natural
disasters.
Helped by the strong economy, the United States could attain budget surplus in 1999
for the first time since the mankind set foot on the moon. The unusually long period of
boom in the 1990s boosted revenues above and contained the mandatory spending be-
low the levels expected at the beginning. But it would be unfair to say that all surpluses
were due to the strong economy. The rules introduced by BEA appear to have been quite
effective in controlling expenditures and thereby reducing budget deficits.
First of all, these rules were aimed at controlling what could actually be controlled.
Discretionary spending is by definition amenable to annual controls by the congress.
Mandatory spending can also be controlled through the PAYGO rule by changing rele-
vant laws. On the other hand, budget deficits are difficult to control because they are af-
fected by business cycles as well as by government policies. When a target cannot be
directly controlled by the authorities in charge, it is difficult to hold them responsible for
the results, and we cannot be sure that they will make their best effort to achieve the
target.
them to arrive at the government-wide baselines, costs of new policy ini-
tiatives, and savings options. Only then can the annual budgeting be closely
linked with the National Fiscal Management Plan.
Eighth, a reconciliation process should be put in place to analyze the
diﬀerence between projected levels of revenue, spending, balance, and debt
and their outturns. This is a critical step to secure accountability and trans-
parency of macrofiscal management. In case of the U.S. federal govern-
ment, the deviation is decomposed into economic, policy, and technical
factors.
Ninth, the internal auditing within line ministries and government agen-
cies should be strengthened. An increased autonomy in financial manage-
ment should be accompanied by an increased awareness of the possibility
of fraud, waste, and abuse. In this regard, we can refer to the case of the
U.S. federal government, where the independence of internal auditors is
guaranteed by the inspector general system, and consider introducing a
similar system.26
Tenth, program budgeting needs to be introduced. The Korean govern-
ment is currently redesigning the structure of its budget accounts around
functions, administrations, and programs. The eﬀort is spearheaded by the
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Table 9.11 Expenditures and revenues of the U.S. federal government (in billions of dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total spending BEA estimates 1,523 1,578 1,645 1,745 1,843
Actuals 1,462 1,516 1,561 1,601 1,653
Discretionary BEA limits 537 539 547 547 548
spending Actuals 544 545 534 549 555
Mandatory BEA estimates 765 795 843 920 996
spending Actuals 715 738 785 809 855
Revenues BEA estimates 1,230 1,306 1,379 1,440 1,523
Actuals 1,259 1,352 1,453 1,579 1,723
Deficits/surpluses BEA estimates –270 –230 –266 –305 –320
Actuals –203 –164 –107 –22 70
Source: OECD (1999).
26. Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, the president appoints inspectors general
(IGs) for certain specified federal establishments, by and with the consent of the Senate, with-
out regard to political aﬃliation and solely on each individual’s experience in specified areas.
Under the Inspector General Amendments of 1988, the heads of designated federal entities
appoint IGs, without the necessity of Senate confirmation. The IG Act identifies 26 federal
establishments that are to have an IG appointed by the president with Senate confirmation
and 30 designated federal entities that are to have an IG appointed by their agency heads. The
IGs perform audits in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards
and report suspected violation of criminal law to the Attorney General. Each IG must pre-
pare semiannual reports that summarize the IG’s activities. The head of each agency trans-
mits these reports unaltered to Congress and subsequently makes them available to the public
(U.S. GAO 1998).
Budget and Accounting Reinvention Oﬃce (BARO).27 The resulting pro-
gram structure will make it easier to allocate resources according to the na-
tional priorities and set ceilings on sectoral spending. Programs will also
act as the basic units of performance management in the future. More will
be discussed on program budgeting shortly.
9.4.4 Performance Management
Overview
As noted previously, budgeting in Korea has traditionally been focused
on the ex ante control of inputs. The authorities have little experience in
performance management by such tools as performance monitoring and
program evaluation. There is no established feedback mechanism that sup-
plies performance information to those in charge of budget preparation
and execution, which partly explains the continuation of some ineﬀective
and ineﬃcient programs.
Performance management becomes more important with the introduc-
tion of the MTEF and top-down budgeting. These changes will allow
greater autonomy to line ministries and can lead to greater ineﬃciency un-
less complemented by a new mechanism to secure accountability on the
part of line ministries.
Figure 9.20 describes the basic framework of performance management.
Starting from the mission of an organization, we set up strategic goals, per-
formance goals, and performance indicators (see table 9.12). Actual per-
formance is assessed through performance monitoring, program evalua-
tion, or program review. These works are documented in strategic plans,
annual performance plans, and annual performance reports. Table 9.13
compares the three tools for performance assessment—monitoring, eval-
uation, and review. Key diﬀerences between evaluation and monitoring are
listed in table 9.14.
In recent years, diverse eﬀorts have been made to strengthen perfor-
mance management in government. Some of them are listed in table 9.15.
In the following, detailed explanation will be given on Performance Man-
agement of Budgetary Programs (PMBP), Self-Assessment of Budgetary
Programs (SABP), and Evaluation of Budgetary Programs (EBP).
Performance Management of Budgetary Programs (PMBP)
Performance Management of Budgetary Programs corresponds to per-
formance monitoring in the previous discussion. It is led by MPB, and its
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27. BARO is a special task force organized in 2004 to lead reforms in the area of program
budgeting, financial reporting, government financial statistics, and the IT system. It is oﬃ-
cially part of MPB but composed of secondees from various organizations including MPB,
MOFE, MOGAHA, and BAI.
Fig. 9.20 Framework of performance management
Table 9.12 Meanings and requirements
Term Meanings and requirements
Mission Means . . . 
• Major results sought by the program or the organization as a whole.
• Starting point for identifying the specific outcomes to be measured and
the specific performance indicators that are needed.
Should . . . 
• Focus on the program effect on customers and the public.
Strategic goals Means . . . 
• Major policy goals that the organization pursues to complete its mission.
Should . . . 
• Be value-free and avoid general or aspirational expressions.
• Be stated clearly and succinctly.
• Be minimal in number.
• Be focused on the final results that the organization pursues.
Performance Means . . . 
goals • Concrete goals that the organization pursues to attain its strategic goals
Should . . . 
• Be specific enough to ascertain, with the help of performance indicators,
whether the performance objectives have been achieved.
design follows the framework of the Government Performance and Results
Act (GPRA) of the U.S. federal government. It is based on the pilot proj-
ect on performance budgeting carried out in 1999 to 2002, which was not
very successful in instilling performance orientation either in line min-
istries or in MPB.28 Performance Management of Budgetary Programs re-
quires line ministries to (a) set up performance goals and indicators, (b)
prepare annual performance plans and reports, and (c) submit them to
MPB at the start of the annual budget cycle (see figure 9.21).
A major drawback of PMBP lies in the fact that it covers only part of
ministerial activities. Those activities not involving large sums of expendi-
ture (such as pure policy making) are excluded from performance moni-
toring. Also, activities for which the benefits of performance monitoring
are expected to be small (such as wages and salaries, basic program expen-
ditures, and general administrative expenses) are excluded as well. This has
the potential to lead line ministries to disregard those activities that are
critical in achieving their overall mission but involve small expenditures or
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Table 9.13 Tools of performance assessment
Tool Main characteristics
Performance • Measures the program performance with a predetermined set of 
monitoring • indicators.
• Can produce information on outputs and outcomes in a frequent
and timely manner at relatively low costs.
• By itself, can rarely explain the causality between inputs and
outputs or outcomes.
Program evaluation • Addresses the question of why and how the program produced
certain outputs and outcomes.
• Employs analytical tools with varying degrees of sophistication.
• Usually requires large amounts of money and time, and cannot be
performed on all programs.
Program review • Assesses the performance and other aspects of a given program with
an explicit aim of helping budgetary decision-making.
• Relies on information from various sources including monitoring
and evaluation.
• Is usually led by the central budget office (e.g., Ministry of Finance).
• Requires a medium level of effort (in between monitoring and
evaluation).
28. In 2001, 39 organizations participated in the pilot. A survey of the pilot (Jun and Park
2002) found that over half of the indicators proposed in the performance reports were based
on outputs and only one-fifth on outcomes. The rest were input indicators, and about two-
thirds of all indicators were nonquantitative ones. The survey also found that many indicators
changed from one year to another, making it diﬃcult to trace program performance over time
consistently. It subsequently proposed the government to applying performance indicators
only to major large-sized expenditure programs for which quantitative indicators are easy to
construct.
Table 9.14 Key differences between evaluation and monitoring
Monitoring Evaluation
• Periodic • Usually episodic
• Assumes appropriateness of program, • Can address a wide range of potential 
• activities, and indicators • questions about a policy, program, or 
• Tracks progress against small number of • project
• indicators • Can identify what has happened as a result
• Usually quantitative • of an intervention and provide guidance 
• Use data routinely gathered or readily • for future directions
• available • Can address “how” and “why” questions
• Cannot indicate causality • Wide range of quantitative and qualitative 
• Difficult to use for impact assessment • research methods possible
• Usually internal • Can use data from different sources
• Can identify unintended as well as planned
impacts and effects
• Can involve internal, external, or self
evaluation
Source: Perrin (2002).
Table 9.15 Diverse initiatives for performance management
Performance management initiatives Organizations in charge
Performance Management of Budgetary Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB)
Programs (PMBP)
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programs (SABP) MPB
Evaluation of Budgetary Programs (EBP) MPB
Government Operations Assessment System Office of Government Policy Coordination (OGPC)
(GOAS)
Management by Objectives (MBO) MOGAHA
Performance Audit BAI
Fig. 9.21 Structure of PMBP
only wages and salaries, and to lose sight of the linkage between the over-
all mission, strategies, and performance goals.
Unlike GPRA, PMBP does not require strategic planning on the part of
line ministries. This is understandable given the position of MPB within
the government. MPB is only one of many ministries under the prime min-
ister’s oﬃce and cannot impose such a broad requirement as strategic plan-
ning on line ministries. But the lack of strategic planning renders it diﬃcult
to focus performance management exercises on the core values of the min-
istries and to derive performance indicators from ministerial missions in a
systematic fashion.
Performance Management of Budgetary Programs, like its pilot project,
has not been very successful. There appears to exist only a lukewarm sup-
port from the top management in MPB. Line ministries are also showing
little enthusiasm for the PMBP. Most importantly, performance reports
are not open to the public, giving little incentive for line ministries to think
seriously about the exercise.
The general failure of PMBP can be explained in several ways. First, it
has been and will be very diﬃcult to set up quantitative indicators for many
government activities, especially when the activity has diverse (and some-
times conflicting) objectives, takes many years to attain the desired objec-
tives, is only one of many factors aﬀecting the outcome, or does not lend
its performance to quantitative measurement by its own nature. Second,
and more importantly, PMBP is not attracting suﬃcient attention from
major stakeholders such as the budget examiners in MPB, managers in line
ministries, parliamentarians, and the general public. Performance infor-
mation provided by PMBP is not detailed enough for budget examiners in
MPB and parliamentarians involved in funding decisions on individual
programs. Managers in line ministries do not find the information useful in
managing their programs. And the general public cannot even access the
information because the reports are not open to them. In short, it is hard
to find real demands for PMBP.
Fortunately, eﬀorts are being made to repair PMBP. According to MPB,
from this year on, all activities (budgetary and nonbudgetary) will be cov-
ered by PMBP, and reports will be open to the public. Real demands for
performance information are being created through SABP and EBP as will
be explained in the following. But still there is no requirement for strategic
planning. So long as strategic plans provide an overarching framework for
results-oriented management, including PMBP, SABP, and EBP, the Ko-
rean government (to be specific, MPB in coordination with the prime min-
ister’s oﬃce) should seriously consider introducing strategic planning in
ministries.
In the United States, federal agencies should prepare strategic plans,
performance plans, and performance reports under the GPRA. Following
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these examples, prescribing more detailed requirements in Korea would
help enrich the performance plans and reports prepared by line ministries.
MPB or any other central agency29 can also review them periodically, rate
their quality, and propose best practices.
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programs (SABP)
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programs, a form of budget review, is also
led by MPB. It was designed after the Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART) of the U.S. federal government. It requires line ministries to assess
their own programs with spending levels above a certain threshold in a
cycle of three years. The assessment is based on 16 questions common to
all types of programs and a few additional questions specific to diﬀerent
types of programs.30 Table 9.16 lists the common questions asked.
Answers to the questions take the form of “yes (1)” or “no (0).” In case
of the questions regarding the achievement of program objectives and the
customer satisfaction, 4-scale answers (1.00, 0.67, 0.33, 0.00) are given. A
weight is assigned to each question and the overall assessment is based on
the weighted sum of the answers. Programs are then classified as “eﬀective
(85–100),” “moderately eﬀective (70–84),” “adequate (50–69),” and “not
eﬀective (0–50).” MPB reviews the results of ministerial self-assessments,
and makes the final assessment.
In 2005, 555 programs were assessed (table 9.17). Among them, 87 (15.7
percent) were classified as not eﬀective, and their funding was cut by 10
percent with some modifications. Such practice of directly linking per-
formance to budgeting has been held as taboo by many experts mainly be-
cause decision making should be based not solely on a limited set of per-
formance information but on broad considerations on, for example, the 
social needs for the programs. But MPB felt that without a direct linkage,
it would be very diﬃcult to invoke serious interest in SABP from line min-
istries. Certainly their strategy worked, and they plan to continue this ex-
ercise annually.
Even though SABP succeeded in creating real demands for performance
information within MPB and also in line ministries, improvements are
needed in several aspects. Just like PART, SABP increased the workload of
budget examiners substantially. It will increase further in coming years as
the assessed programs accumulate and the examiners need to reassess the
old cases when necessary. To alleviate this problem, an arrangement was
made this year with the small division in charge of coordinating SABP
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29. The National Assembly Budget Oﬃce and the Evaluation Research Institute of the
Board of Audit and Inspection can play the role of GAO in this respect.
30. Types of programs are infrastructure investment, procurement of large-scale facilities
and equipment, provision of direct services, capital injection, subsidies to private entities,
grants to local governments, and R&D.
eﬀorts within MPB making a preliminary assessment of the documents
prepared by line ministries, and then passing their opinions to budget ex-
aminers who make the final assessment. This arrangement is not neces-
sarily optimal given the limited capacity of that division and the possible
lack of ownership in SABP results by budget examiners. Greater resource
for SABP is being called for.
In addition, eﬀorts are needed to go beyond scoring the programs. The
U.S. Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB) makes recommendations
for line ministries to improve their program performance (figure 9.22). This
year, MPB plans to start producing recommendations for line ministries. It
remains to be seen how eﬀective these recommendations will be to improve
the program eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. In the United States, diﬃculties
were encountered in communicating OMB’s intentions to line ministries,
prioritizing among many diﬀerent recommendations, and securing ade-
quate resources within OMB for the follow-up of recommendations. MPB
should prepare themselves for similar diﬃculties.
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Table 9.16 Common questions for the SABP
Section Common questions
Program design • Does the program have clear purposes and legal or other bases?
• Can the government intervention be justified?
• Is government spending necessary to achieve the objectives?
• Is the program duplicative of other program?
• Has the program been subjected to an objective feasibility study?
• Is the proposed program design most cost-effective?
• Are performance goals and indicators in place?
• Do performance goals and indicators fully reflect program objectives?
• Are the targets set at reasonable levels?
Program management • Is the implementation being monitored regularly?
• Is the program being implemented as planned?
• Are efforts being made to reduce costs or increase efficiency?
Performance assessment • Has an objective and comprehensive program evaluation been 
and feedback • conducted?
• Did the program achieve the intended objectives?
• Are customers and stakeholders satisfied with the program performance?
• Is the agency utilizing the assessment results for program improvement
and budget planning?
Table 9.17 Results of 2005 SABP
Moderately Not
Total Effective effective Adequate effective
555 28 99 341 87
100.0 (%) 5.0 17.9 61.4 15.7
Evaluation of Budgetary Programs
The last addition to the armory of performance management is Evalua-
tion of Budgetary Programs (EBP), which is an eﬀort led by MPB to set up
a systematic approach to program evaluation in line ministries.
Each year, MPB would commission evaluation studies on programs that
it considers need critical assessment. Korea Development Institute (KDI)
organizes evaluation teams and oversees the studies. For this purpose, KDI
has published a manual for program evaluation, which details the process
and standards to be followed by evaluation teams.
Three programs were evaluated from late 2005 to early 2006 on a pilot
basis. From 2006 on, around 10 programs will be evaluated each year. Pi-
lot studies uncovered various diﬃculties in carrying out the evaluation.
Most programs lacked clearly specified goals and necessary data to assess
the achievement of goals. Evaluators found it diﬃcult to understand the
structure and context of individual programs and oﬃcial documents were
not of much help in this regard. MPB and line ministries often had diﬀer-
ent expectations on evaluation, with the former focusing on funding deci-
sions and the latter on program management, which cannot be easily rec-
onciled with each other.
To overcome these diﬃculties, KDI’s evaluation manual stresses the im-
portance of, at the start of evaluation studies, asking line ministries to pro-
vide suﬃcient details of the program, identifying the program structure
and context, redefining the program objectives, describing the intervention
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Fig. 9.22 Number of recommendations
Source: U.S. Oﬃce of Management and Budget.
logic of the program, setting up performance indicators and benchmarks
for program success, and deciding on the purpose and scope of the evalu-
ation. These steps should be taken in a transparent way and in full cooper-
ation with relevant stakeholders including the ministries in charge of the
program and MPB.
Perhaps the most diﬃcult part would be describing the intervention
logic and setting up performance indicators. The manual recommends the
use of logic models for this purpose. Figure 9.23 gives an example of a logic
model in the case of a road-safety campaign.
EBP is expected to provide information on program performance that
can be used for SABP. In fact, the first question of the last section in table
9.16 asks whether an objective and comprehensive program evaluation has
been conducted for a program. On the other hand, the information gath-
ered through SABP can be used in the selection of candidate programs for
EBP. In this sense, PMBP and SABP are complementary to each other. A
similar relationship exists between EBP and PMBP. EBP can propose new
and refined performance indicators for PMBP, as explained previously. At
the same time, EBP can utilize the performance data collected through
PMBP in conducting evaluation.
EBP has many challenges to overcome in the coming years. The ultimate
aim is to set up a standard and provide examples for program evaluation,
and to instill evaluation culture in line ministries, which, we hope, will con-
duct evaluation voluntarily on their own programs as part of their daily
business.
9.4.5 Program Budgeting
Presently, the budget is classified first by the general and special ac-
counts and funds. Then within these accounts and funds, it is further di-
vided up by five levels of classification—chapters, sections, subsections,
items, and subitems.31 MPB usually examines the budget requests by line
ministries at the level of subitems, which totaled 8,038 in fiscal year 2006.
Such a detailed control of inputs by the central budget oﬃce produced
many problems mentioned previously—weak linkages between budgeting
and policy making, tiresome budget negotiation between MPB and line
ministries, and limited accountability and autonomy of line ministries.
The present classification system has other drawbacks as well. Funding
for a program is often scattered across various accounts and funds. For ex-
ample, the development of fishing villages and ports is simultaneously
funded by the general account, three special accounts (fiscal financing,
agricultural and fisheries structural adjustment, balanced national devel-
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31. The first three of these are controlled by the parliament, while the last two by MPB. For
example, when a ministry wants to shift appropriation from a subsection to another, it needs
an approval from MPB and the parliament. But when it wants to shift appropriation from an
item to another, it needs an approval only from MPB.
opment), and one fund (fisheries development). This makes it diﬃcult to
identify the total amount of funding provided for a program, and manage
its performance.
Inconsistency is another problem; some items or subitems cover a wide
range of activities and involve a large amount of funding, while others are
associated with very specific activities and a small amount of funding.
To remedy these problems and support other reform initiatives—medium-
term expenditure framework and performance management—MPB set
out to introduce program budgeting. In essence, four instead of five levels 
of classification are brought in, the input controls are drastically reduced,
and the classification by accounts and funds is abolished. The new classifi-
cation is shown in figure 9.24. The present 26 chapters, 79 sections, and 718
subsections are regrouped into 16 areas and 68 sectors; 718 subsections
and 2,411 items into 1,043 programs; and 8,038 subitems into 3,594 proj-
ects. The control by MPB will be exercised at the level of projects, and that
by the parliament at the level of programs. Line ministries will have full dis-
cretion on activities within each project.
9.4.6 Government Financial Statistics
The limited scope of the government financial statistics has been pointed
out as one of the major drawbacks of the Korean fiscal management sys-
tem. As explained previously, the consolidated central government covers
the general and special accounts and funds. But it excludes some impor-
tant fiscal activities of the government. For example, the National Health
Insurance is excluded from the consolidated government even though it is
a social insurance program that covers over 90 percent of the population.
Also excluded are various quasi-government organizations and research
institutions (such as KDI), which are mainly financed and whose activities
are closely supervised by the government.
Even within the central government, the revenue and expenditure statis-
tics on one hand and the government asset and liability statistics on the
other hand have diﬀerent coverage. The latter excludes some funds that are
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Fig. 9.23 Intervention logic of a road-safety campaign
included in the former, with possible underreporting of the true size of gov-
ernment assets and liabilities. In addition, government assets are reported
separately for credits (e.g., government loans), properties (e.g., securities
and premises), cash holdings (e.g., deposits at the central bank), and sup-
plies, making it impossible to get the overall picture of financial and non-
financial assets.
Logical consistency is compromised also in the treatment of treasury
bonds held by the National Pension Fund and other funds. These bond
holdings are recorded simultaneously as government assets (as they are
held by funds) and liabilities (as they are issued by the government). Ide-
ally, such bond holdings should be netted out, and the asset and liability
statistics should only reflect the transactions between the government and
the private sector.
The consolidated central government also shows large discrepancies
with the National Accounts in its coverage. The latter includes the Na-
tional Health Insurance in the government sector but excludes some activ-
ities such as the credit programs of the National Housing Fund (NHF). As
a result, the amount of government liabilities diﬀers significantly between
two statistical systems.
We have similar problems in the data for public financial and nonfinan-
cial corporations. Together with the general government (the central and
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Fig. 9.24 Old and new budget classification systems
local governments and social security funds), public corporations consti-
tute the public sector. In Korea, however, there does not exist a consistent
definition of public corporations. For example, various financial funds
such as the credit guarantee funds are not included in the public sector even
though they have every aspect of public financial corporations. The gov-
ernment does not publish a comprehensive review on the financial status of
individual public corporations, let alone consolidated financial statements.
This practice makes it diﬃcult to assess the financial health of the public
sector in general, and the implicit fiscal burden incurred through quasi-
fiscal activities of financial funds in particular. Of particular concern are
credit guarantee funds32 that significantly expanded their activities after
the recent economic crisis. At the end of 2003, the outstanding stock of
guarantees amounted to 11 percent of GDP, far higher than in other coun-
tries where the public guarantees are usually less than 1 percent of GDP.
Yet no reports exist that explain the future risks these funds may impose on
government finance.
As a first step to address this problem, BARO is redefining the scope of
the public sector. The starting point is the revised 2001 Government Fi-
nance Statistics Manual of IMF. BARO is also searching for ways to pro-
duce comprehensive, accurate, and timely information on the government
financial position by introducing accrual accounting and building a new
IT system. The IT system is expected to centralize an array of financial in-
formation from all organizations within the government sector. When
BARO’s work is completed by 2007, big improvements will have been made
in financial reporting and government financial statistics.
9.5 Roads Ahead
The primary responsibilities of any fiscal management system lie in sup-
porting aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative eﬃciency, and operational
eﬃciency (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi 1999). The Korean government
had maintained aggregate fiscal discipline since the 1980s in a strategic
dominance-based approach and pursued allocative and operational eﬃ-
ciency through a detailed input control on annual budgets. However, the
changing environment after the financial crisis of 1997 necessitated a tran-
sition toward a target-based approach and a stronger emphasis on outputs
and outcomes.
In response to these challenges, the government introduced the National
Fiscal Management Plan, various performance management tools, pro-
gram budgeting, and a new statistical system. These reforms are all in line
with the global standard in fiscal management as espoused by international
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32. These are the Infrastructure Credit Guarantee Funds; the Korea Technology Credit
Guarantee Fund; the Credit Guarantee Fund for Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery; the
Korea Credit Guarantee Fund; and the Housing Finance Credit Guarantee Fund.
organizations. It is interesting to note that, unlike other developing coun-
tries where fiscal reforms are often imposed by these organizations as a
string attached to the aids provided, the Korean government began the re-
form process on their own initiatives. Accordingly, the ownership of reform
could be secured and genuine eﬀorts guaranteed. The reforms could also
be tailored to the specific needs of the Korean government because they
were designed by insiders who had better knowledge on the institutional
and historical context.
Even after the reform, there remain many improvements to be made in
our fiscal management system as explained in the text. Consolidating the
reforms will be the main challenge for the Korean government in coming
years.
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Comment Gilberto M. Llanto
An observer like me can only look with envy at how the Korean govern-
ment showed tight discipline in solving the persistent fiscal deficits of the
70s and 80s. Fiscal tightening in the 1980s was a delicate balancing act, but
the principle of expenditure within revenue—or the balanced budget prin-
ciple—produced wonderful results in terms of keeping the public debt at a
minimal level and taming the fiscal deficit. The notable achievement of ob-
serving a balanced budget was that it was not formalized in either law or a
regulation. It was the determined eﬀort of the government that made the
big diﬀerence. The self-discipline paid oﬀ because the Korean government
could plan massive fiscal supports to troubled financial institutions when
the Asian financial crisis hit the economy.
The amazing phenomenon was that the Korean government was able to
reduce the ratio of government debt to GDP a few years after the financial
crisis. The total public debt burden was 30 percent of GDP around 1998 to
1999 but the budget recorded a surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP in 2000. The
surplus has remained in the following years. Strong economic growth and
rapid increases in revenues no doubt made this possible.
Mr. Young-Sun Koh was, however, quick to point out that excluding the
National Pension Fund from the consolidated balance indicates that there
were “budget deficits since 1989, except in 2002.”
Another indicator of fiscal health is the status of government liabilities.
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